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Capitalist Agriculture and Labour Contracting
in Northern Peru, 1880-1905
by M I C H A E L J. G O N Z A L E S *

Introduction
Latin Americanists have become increasingly intrigued with questions
concerning rural labour and oppression. In recent publicadons, traditional
interpretations of peonage, labour contracting, wage labour and other topics
have been questioned by historians with access to new documentary materials.
Peru has been the setting for much of this discussion because of the important
changes which occurred during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries and the unusual opportunity to understand them since the creation
of the Archivo del Fuero Agrario.
Much of the interest in Peru has centered on the expansion of the sugar
industry and the efforts of sugar planters to reach out into the highlands to
acquire labourers from among peasant communities. This process has been
referred to as enganche, from the verb enganchar, meaning to hook or to
entrap. A t the time, it evoked the wrath of the pro-Indian intelligentsia who
wrote exposes condemning the system as little better than slavery. While
their heart was in the right place, these writers did not have the detachment,
access to documentary materials nor the advantage of historical perspective to
write completely accurate and unbiased accounts. Nevertheless, until recently
they were the principal sources for studying enganche.
This is reflected in the early work of Peter F. Klaren and others where
unsuspecting highlanders are tricked and exploited at every turn by un1

2

* The author wishes to thank Senor Humberto Rodriguez Pastor for assistance in
gathering material and Professors Roger M. Haigh and Peter Von Sivers for their
useful comments on an earlier draft.
Much of the recent research on Peruvian agrarian history is reviewed by Arnold J.
Bauer in 'Rural Workers in Spanish America: Problems in Peonage and Oppres
sion,' Hispanic American Historical Review, No. 59 (February, 1979), pp. 34-64.
Works critical of enganche include: Alberto Ulloa Sotomayor, 'La organizaci6n
social y legal del trabajo en el Peru,' (Ph.D. Diss., Universidad de San Marcos,
1916), Chapter XI; Marco Aurelio Denegri, La crisis del enganche (Lima, 1 9 1 1 ) ;
Francisco Mostajo, 'Algunas ideas sobre la cuestion obrera (contrato de enganche),'
(Ph.D. Diss., Universidad de Arequipa, 1 9 1 3 ) ; and Dora Mayer de Zulen, El
indigena peruano o los cien anos de republica libre e independiente (Lima, 1921).
o o 2 2 - 2 i 6 x / 8 o / / L / 4 S - i 2 2 2 $02.00 © 1980 Cambridge University Press
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scrupulous labour contractors and hacendados. As in the Indianist tracts of
the early twentieth century, deception, violence and indebted peonage are
emphasized as the methods used to get peons down to the coast and to keep
them there. With the availability of estate and contractor letter files, how
ever, a different picture of enganche is emerging. Klaren, for example, after
reading some of the new materials, modified his interpretadon to argue that
coercion and peonage were paramount only during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, after which monetary reward was the principal
mechanism behind enganche.*
In a revisionist essay, Arnold J. Bauer recently reviewed much of the recent
literature which utilizes heretofore unavailable hacienda records. Bauer
devotes considerable space to Peru and the topic of enganche, although the
bulk of the new research in this area is only now appearing in print.
Bauer argues that, because of competition for labour, contractors had to offer
peons good wages and working conditions, which were readily accepted.
If indebted peonage and force were ever utilized, they apparendy were never
important variables in labour contracting.
Bauer's article has elicited a vigorous rebuttal from Brian Loveman who
criticizes him for over-generalizing and ignoring older studies which docu
ment cases of worker abuse. For the northern coast of Peru, Loveman also
cites a recent study which shows a more complex picture of labour contracting
and worker-planter relations.
What follows is an attempt to shed light on this controversial topic.
T o do so, I have consulted new primary source materials and placed the
problem more within the context of economic change, both on the regional
and international levels, and evolving methods of social and political control.
My findings lead me to argue that the genesis of enganche, the crucial transi
tion period from 1880 to 1905, combined elements of coercion and violence
with capital incentives from the onset.
3

5

0

The development of enganche reflected the linkage of the expanding export
sector on the coast, which had available large amounts of capital, with the
3

4

5

8

Peter F. Klaren, Modernization, Dislocation, and Aprismo: Origins of the Peruvian
Apista Party, 1870-1932
(Austin, Texas, 1973), pp. 26-8. For a similar view, see
Ernesto Yepes del Castillo, Pent, 1820-1920 (Lima, 1972), pp. 209-13.
Peter F. Klaren, 'The social and economic consequences of modernization in the
Peruvian sugar industry, 1870-1930,' in Kenneth Duncan and Ian Rutledge (eds.),
Land and Labour in Latin America (Cambridge, 1977), p. 293.
Bauer, op. cit., p. 38.
Brian Loveman, 'Critique of Arnold J. Bauer's "Rural Workers in Spanish America:
Problems of Peonage and Oppression,"' Hispanic American Historical
Review,
No. 59 (August, 1979), pp. 478-86. Also see Bauer's reply in the same issue,
pp. 486-90.
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largely subsistence economy of the northern sierra where demographic and
economic pressures made migration attractive. Thus, sugar planters could
generally control the flow of migration to their plantations through offering
cash advances and wages to labour contractors and peasants. However, this
did not preclude contractors from resorting to duplicity and coercion to meet
labour quotas when necessary.
Planters gauged their labour needs primarily on the basis of production
schedules. Ideally, they sought to maximize production at all times but could
not always afford to do so. During these years, their principal barometer for
investment in labour was the prevailing price of sugar on the world market.
This was not necessarily a precise calculation but rather a guideline to
anticipated profits.
Those peasants who responded voluntarily to work on the coast were
attracted by the relatively high wages paid on the plantations. They migrated
at first to earn spot incomes during slack periods in the agricultural cycle
back home, but gradually chose to maximize their incomes by remaining on
the coast for longer periods of time. Indebted workers who wanted to return
home, however, were often forced to remain behind until their debts had
been repaid.
Indebted bondage arose from the specific labour needs of the sugar cane
plantations. Because these plantations relied on irrigation as opposed to
seasonal rainfall, they planted and harvested almost year round. This made it
imperative to have a stable work force, and compelled planters, especially
during periods of labour scarcity, to attempt to hold on to indebted workers.
However, on the northern coast peonage did not work as efficiently as it is
generally portrayed in the literature.
Historical

and geographical

background

By the late nineteenth century, sugar production was becoming increas
ingly concentrated in the northern departments of La Libertad and
Lambayeque. This reflected ecological advantages, particularly superior soils
and more hours of intense sunlight which matured the cane more rapidly, as
well as the dynamic leadership of a new group of planters with access to large
amounts of capital. The largest plantations were located in four valleys, the
Moche (or Santa Catalina), Chicama, Sana and Lambayeque, which were
irrigated by Andean rivers. The regions in between the valleys were virtually
uncultivated owing to the almost total lack of rainfall on the coast.
7

7

Michael Joseph Gonzales, 'Cayalu': The Formation of a Rural Proletariat on a
Peruvian Sugar Cane Plantation, 1 8 7 5 - 1 9 3 3 ' (Ph.D. Diss., U.C., Berkeley, 1978),
Chapters I and II.
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The principal problems facing the sugar industry during the late nine
teenth century were low sugar prices and labour shortages. The price of sugar
began to fall in the 1870s and continued downwards, with an occasional
upswing, into the twentieth century. This was the result of supply outstrip-
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ping demand as beet sugar was introduced on to the world market at the
same time that cane growers were increasing production.
Sugar cane plantations on the Peruvian coast, as elsewhere in the Americas,
had relied upon black slavery since the sixteenth century. When abolition
finally came to Peru in 1854, planters utilized the indemnification they
received from the government for the loss of their slaves to import over
100,000 Chinese indentured servants. The Chinese remained the mainstay of
coastal agriculture until 1874 when the British and Chinese governments
combined to bring a halt to the coolie trade.
Planters attempted to combat the ensuing labour shortage as well as low
sugar prices by carrying out a series of technological improvements designed
to eliminate jobs and increase production. The principal improvements con
sisted of mill modernization, installation of portable railroads to carry cane
to the mill, construction of railroad lines connecting plantations with coastal
ports and heavier reliance on steam powered tractors.
Initially, planters did not seriously consider converting to Peruvian wage
labour because the change-over would be expensive and risky, particularly
during the chaotic years during and immediately after the War of the Pacific
(1879-1884). The decision to recruit local peasants finally came as the result
of the growing unproductivity of the Chinese and improving economic and
political conditions which favoured increased investment in labour.
This can be seen through the experience of the sugar cane plantation
Cayalti. One of roughly a dozen plantations which produced the bulk of
Peruvian sugar, Cayalti spanned over 77,000 acres in the heart of the Sana
Valley. The estate was an important sugar producer as early as 1622 and it is
one of the principal co-operatives on the north coast today. The history of the
estate in the modern period is tied to the Aspillaga family which used its
sugar fortune to rise to a position of social and political prominence. The
Aspillagas purchased the estate in 1859 and managed it throughout the
period under consideration here.
8

9
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8
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See Appendix A.
Frederick P. Bowser, The African Slave in Colonial Peru, 1524-1650
(Stanford,
1974); Watt Stewart, Chinese Bondage in Peru (Durham, North Carolina, 1 9 5 1 ) ;
Arnold J. Meagher, 'The Introduction of Chinese Laborers to Latin America: The
"Coolie Trade," 1 8 4 7 - 1 8 7 4 ' (Ph.D. Diss., U.C., Davis, 1975).
Gonzales, op. cit. Chapter III.
Susan Ramirez Horton, 'The Sugar Estates of the Lambayeque Valley, 1670-1800:
A Contribution to Peruvian Agrarian History,' ( M A . Thesis, University of Wis
consin, Madison, 1973), p. 14. The purchase date of Cayalti is in the memorandum
dated 12 February 1946, El Archivo del Fuero Agrario, Lima. For the size of
Cayalti, see Certificacidn de los titulos de la hacienda Cayalti con sus anexos,
17 November 1920, El Archivo del Fuero Agrario.
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The Aspillagas viewed the end to the coolie trade with great alarm writing
that the Chinese are ' . . . everything to our agriculture and the best labourers
who we can obtain,' and beseeching the Lord to allow immigration to
continue. Although their prayers were not answered, the Aspillagas con
tinued to believe that new sources of servile labour could be located. In the
meantime, they held on to their aging Chinese workers, sometimes resorting
to indebted peonage and force. The Chinese, however, were becoming in
creasingly unproductive. For example, in June, 1891 the Aspillagas described
300 of their 420 Chinese workers as ' . . . old and tired men.. . . ' They wrote
that absenteeism was such a serious problem, especially on Mondays, that
milling sometimes had to be stopped, and those Chinese who did work were
only capable of handling skilled jobs, such as operating machinery.
12

15

The conclusion was inescapable that an alternative source of labour had to
be found. Although this would be costly and uncertain, planters were en
couraged by indications that the national economy and polity were stabilizing
after years of anarchy. In particular, foreign credit was becoming increasingly
available and a new oligarchy was forming around the Civilista Party in
which sugar planters assumed a prominent role.
14

Labour supply
Coast
The commitment to labour contracting in the highlands was made by the
Aspillagas in the late 1880s. But before then they had cautiously begun to
recruit peasant labour from nearby towns and native communities on the
coast. Coastal workers had worked from time to time at Cayalti in the past,
usually on irrigation canals. Now Cayalti hoped to recruit large numbers of
costenos, especially from the neighbouring town of Sana, to work at all jobs.
1 2

Antero Aspillaga Barrera to Ram6n Aspi'llaga Ferrebu, 14 June 1875, El Archivo
del Fuero Agrario. The following abbreviations will be used throughout this article:
Victor Aspillaga Taboada - V . A . T ; Antero Aspillaga Barrera - A.A.B; Baldomero
Aspillaga Barrera - B.A.B.; Ram6n Aspillaga Barrera - R.A.B.; Ram6n Aspillaga
Ferrebu - R.A.F; Ismael Aspillaga Barrera - I.A.B; Aspillaga Hermanos (firm) A.H.; El Archivo del Fuero Agrario - A.F.A.

1 3

A.H. to A.H., 9 June 1891, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 22 March 1892, A.F.A.; A.H. to
A.H., 12 Oct. 1889, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 15 Feb 1890, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H.,
7 June 1893, A.F.A.
For a discussion of improving economic conditions in the 1890s, see Rosemary
Thorp and Geoffrey Bertram, Peru 1890-1977
(New York, 1978). On increasing
political stability and the emerging oligarchy, see Dennis Gilbert, The Oligarchy
and the Old Regime in Peru (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977). Antero Aspillaga Barrera was one
of the leading political figures of his day.
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As early as 1879, the Aspillagas had cast an envious eye toward that small
community.
The peons and Chinos Libres are behaving well and little by little their numbers
will increase - [but] what we want is for all of the Saneros to become our peons
since they are the most secure and best suited for us because they are the closest.
18

Despite their economic and political influence, however, the Aspillagas
were never able to recruit as many Saneros as they desired. As far as can be
determined, the largest number of Saneros to work at Cayalti was 100 in
1923, or 4.6 percent of the entire work force. Saneros stayed away from
Cayalti for several reasons. Not only were they angry with the Aspillagas for
having stolen much of their land, but they preferred to work on rice estates
where the pay was higher and the work more to their liking. In general,
they tended to move from estate to estate, rarely working in any one place for
a long period of time. In fact, it was usually only during floods and other
calamitous times that relatively large numbers of costefios could be found at
Cayalti. The Aspillagas commented on coastal workers in 1889 as follows:
16

Those from the coast, or zambos [persons of mixed black and Indian blood], are
scarce and the Saneros, if you could round up 100 or so of them, we could not
acclimatise them in any manner whatsoever, because the majority of them are
lazy men who go around looking for a new patron every week, that is to say,
looking for where they can do less. We need then authorization to send con
tractors from the interior and from the coast, who will always be preferable for
making loans with their own capital.. . .
Presendy, with the rice harvest, the work force on the large [sugar] estates
always diminishes because of the attraction that this work has for them, but happily
this is already passing.
17

It seems likely that other north coast sugar plantations had similar experi
ences with costefios. For example, the estate Pomalca in the Lambayeque
Valley occasionally used coastal labour but the majority of its workers were
non-costeiios.
Peter Klaren argues in his book that many of the small
farmers who sold out to the plantation Casa Grande in the Chicama Valley
eventually came to work for that estate. He does not determine, however,
whether or not they became resident workers, which is an important distinc
tion. Some light can be shed on this issue by Victor Aspillaga Taboada, who
visited the Chicama Valley in 1907 and observed t h a t ' . . .from the town of
18

19

1 0

1 8

1 7

1 8

1 0

A.H. to A.H. 9 September 1879, A.F.A.
Gonzales, op. cit., pp. 2 1 8 - 2 2 .
A.H. to A.H., 5 June 1889 (a), A.F.A.
Contratos de la Hacienda Pomalca, A.F.A.; and Douglas E. Horton, Haciendas and
Co-operatives (Madison, Wisconsin, 1973), p. 18.
Klaren, Modernization,

Dislocation,

and Aprismo,

Chapter II.
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Paijan leave a large number [una buena cantidad] of people to work on this
hacienda [Casa Grande] by jobs.'
There is another, more fundamental, reason why costenos could have never
constituted a majority of workers on coastal estates; namely, the north coast
was too thinly populated to supply the thousands of workers sugar plantations
required. This problem had existed since the Spanish conquest which had
decimated the native population on the coast and forced planters to import
black slaves.
20

21

Japan
By the turn of the present century, planters had focused their attention
on two new sources of labour: Japanese contract labourers and Peruvian
peasants from the neighbouring highlands. Japanese immigration, how
ever, proved to be a disappointment to both planters and immigrants. In
the first place, only 17,764 Japanese entered Peru between 1898 and 1923,
which was far short of the number needed. Furthermore, many immigrants
quickly left Peru on their own accord or were expelled by planters. The
problem actually began in Japan where emigration companies painted a
pleasant picture of Peruvian plantation life. Once in Peru, the Japanese soon
discovered that the coast was hot and unhealthy, and that planters often times
refused to pay stipulated wages and even subjected workers to corporal
punishment. For planters there soon developed a problem over wages because
Japanese workers, according to their contracts, received a daily wage while
Peruvian and Chinese workers were paid by piece work. In almost all cases,
the Japanese ended up being paid more for less work.
A t Cayalti, the Japanese had a minimal impact, as only fifty workers were
contracted and they lasted but two months. Neighbouring estates ordered
more Japanese than Cayalti but the results were equally disappointing.
Only in the Departments of Lima and Cafiete, on the central and southern
coasts, did sugar plantations receive long-term benefits from Japanese immi
gration.
22

Sierra
Labour contracting in the northern sierra turned out to be the final solution
to the labour needs of the sugar plantations. The sierra was the planters' last
2

° V.A.T. to A.H., 18 June 1907, A.F.A.
Bowser, op. cit.
Gonzales, op. cit., pp. 2 1 5 - 1 8 ; Bill Albert, An Essay on the Peruvian
Industry, 1880-1920 (Norwich, 1976), pp. 1038-1053.
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resort, as the few serranos who they had employed in the past had either
quickly fallen ill or had returned home after only a short stay. Now, how
ever, they had little choice but to attempt to mobilize large numbers of highlanders in order to save their industry.
As it turned out, serranos had several reasons for wanting to migrate.
The northern sierra was relatively populous, economically underdeveloped,
and plagued by banditry, while the plantations paid good wages. The popula
tion of the northern highlands was predominandy rural, congregated into
towns, villages, native communities, and haciendas. In 1876 the Department
of Cajamarca had a population of 213,000, while the highlands of the
Department of La Libertad contained 119,500 inhabitants. The Province
of Chota in Cajamarca, which became a centre for labour contracting, had a
population of 51,000, only 11,000 less than the entire north coast, including
urban areas. Moreover, according to the Census of 1876, two-thirds of the
inhabitants of the northern sierra were either white or mestizo, so that the
coast was not as culturally alien to them as it was to the Indians of the central
and southern sierra.
The northern sierra was not a particularly prosperous region. The economy
was predominandy agricultural and pastoral, except for some isolated mining
activity in Hualgayoc (coal) and Pataz (gold). Cajamarquenos produced
wheat, wool, sheep, mules, and minerals which they sold in adjacent towns
and villages as well as in the Amazon Basin and on the coast. Revenues
earned were primarily spent on the coast for cotton, sugar, salt, clothing, and
mining equipment. In 1855, ^ exchange, owing largely to the value of
minerals, netted Cajamarquenos a surplus of 175,325 pesos.
Nevertheless, the majority of peasants did not share in this modest profit.
For them, the key to prosperity was access to land, and this was a region of
latifundia and minifundia. Thus, in 1903, Pelayo Puga, whose family owned
a 737,000 acre estate in Cajamarca, wrote that land was either owned by
huge haciendas or divided into extremely small plots. And even today
Cajamarquenos recall that the problem of latifundia-minifundia was a key
23

24

s

25

2 3

2 4

2 5

Francisco de Rivero, Memoria o scan apuntamientos sobre la industria agricola del
Peru y sobre algunos medios que pudieran adoptarse (Lima, 1845), pp. 2 1 - 2 ;
[Domingo Elias and Juan Rodriguez], Inmigracidn de Chinos, ventajas que proporcionan al pais (Lima, 1851), pp. 19-20. Both sources contain personal testimony
by coastal sugar planters on this point.
Censo General de la Reptiblica del Peru, Formado en 1876, Vol. V, Huanuco, lea,
Junin, Lambayeque, La Libertad (Lima, 1878). The only complete copy of the
1876 census is in the Biblioteca de la Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos,
Lima.
Juan Sarachaga, Ed. 'Estadistica fisica y politica del Departamento de Cajamarca
(1855),' in Coleccidn Fenix, Vol. XVII, Biblioteca Nacional, Lima.
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26

reason why their ancestors migrated to the coast. Moreover, because of poor
soils, ownership of two or three plots of land might not guarantee prosperity.
For example, Baldomero Aspillaga Barrera observed in 1892 that the land
scape of the Province of Hualgayoc, an area of recruitment by Cayalti, was
either very hilly or barren fladand. He also noted that the coal industry in the
region was already in decline, and this must have deprived many people of a
livelihood.
Furthermore, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the lives
and property of serranos were threatened by endemic banditry. For example,
in 1902 the Sub-Prefect of Huamachuco, an area of heavy recruitment by
estates in the Chicama and Santa Catalina Valleys, wrote to the Prefect,
complaining that armed bands roamed the countryside, committing the worst
possible crimes. He stated that in the Districts of Marcabal and Sarin towns
were filled with 'thieves and assassins' who carried firearms in public, and he
ended by pleading with the Prefect to create two new rural police stations.
In a similar vein, several citizens from Cutervo, a recruitment area frequendy
exploited by estates from the Lambayeque Valley and occasionally by Cayalti,
asked the central government in 1904 to create a new province for the sole
purpose of controlling banditry. They wrote that the area was dominated by
private armies which included bandits from Ecuador, Piura and Amazonas.
Moreover, in Chota, people today remember that the prevalence of catde
rusding was another reason why their ancestors migrated.
For all these reasons, therefore, serranos sought a better life on the coast.
There, on sugar plantations they could earn a cash wage far superior to any
paid in the sierra, except in a few mining areas.
For serranos to replace Chinese, however, required a herculean effort.
Thousands of peasants would have to be mobilized, transported to the coast
in organized contingents, and preferably made to stay for long periods of
time. By themselves, planters may have found this to have been an extremely
difficult, if not impossible, task. Here, they were fortunate to acquire the
services of labour contractors, or enganchadores,
who largely succeeded
in meeting their needs.
27

28

29

2 8

Pelayo Puga, La pita de brazos para la agricultura de la costa del Peru (Lima,
1903); Interviews conducted by John Giditz in Cajamarca during the 1970s.
Gitlitz kindly shared this information with me during a conversation in Lima on
5 September 1 9 7 4 .

2 7

B.A.B. to A.H., 16 February 1892, A.F.A.
Memoria que presenta el Sub-Prefecto de la Provincia de Huamachuco a la Prefectura del Departamento, May 26, 1902. Biblioteca Nacional, Lima.

2 8

2 9

Giditz Interviews. 'Los Hijos de Cutervo,' Proyectada Provincia de Cutervo (Lima,
1904), in Coleccidn Fenix, Vol. XVII. Biblioteca Nacional, Lima.
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Most labour contractors were serranos, and for logical reasons. Enganchadores had to be intimately familiar with the locales where they contracted, as
only residents could be, and it was important that they be men of local
influence, persons with access to labour and capital. Thus, it is not surprising
that most enganchadores
were either prosperous serrano merchants or
hacendados.
Serrano
merchants, of course, had had contact with the coast for some
time, buying and selling the products mentioned above. It is only logical,
therefore, that they would have been familiar with the needs of coastal
plantations and willing to become contractors to make more money. Besides,
the more important contractors were allowed to operate stores on the planta
tions, stocked with their own merchandise. This was an excellent business
opportunity.
Several enganchadores
are specifically identified as either hacendados or
merchants in the surviving records of north coast sugar plantations. For
example, when Baldomero Aspillaga Barrera visited Cayalti's principal con
tractor, Jose Santos Medina Cedron, in February, 1892 he described him
as the most important merchant in Bambamarca, and a very prestigious
person within the community. Pomalca's principal contractor from 1900 to
1933, Eduardo Tiravante, owned at least two haciendas in the Province of
Chota, Churucancha and Mollebamba. Likewise, Daniel Orrego, who con
tracted for both Pomalca and Cayalti in the Province of Santa Cruz, was a
merchant-hacendado who at one point was governor of the province.
Similarly, a woman contractor at Laredo in the Santa Catalina Valley,
Matilde Martin Vda. de Pinillos, held usufruct over the estate Chusgon,
which in 1913 extended over 295,000 acres and was home for 2,826
persons.
-

30

Contractors tended to be persons of substance because position and wealth
facilitated labour recruitment. A big merchant like Jose Santos Medina
Cedron, for example, sold goods on credit to local peasants who agreed to
discount their debt by working at Cayalti. In this fashion, Medina Cedron
not only made a profit on sales but earned a commission from the Aspillagas,
based on the amount of work done by peons under his contract. Owners
and renters of haciendas, moreover, regularly supplied plantations with peons
from their estates. Thus in May, 1897 an Aspillaga wrote: ' T h e peons from
31

3 0

B.A.B. to A.H., 16 February 1892, A.F.A.; Contract between Eduardo Tiravante
and the Hacienda Pomalca, 20 June 1 9 1 7 , A.F.A.; Contract between Daniel Orrego
and the Hacienda Pomalca, 26 January 1 9 1 0 , A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 8 February
1906, A.F.A.; Informe sobre la Hacienda Chusgon, 23 April 1958, A.F.A.; Planillas
of the Plantation Laredo, 1900-1908, A.F.A.

si B.A.B. to A.H., 16 February 1892, A.F.A.
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Chota can only be contracted by gamonales from the area [as] they know
and understand its complexities.. . . ' Earlier, the Aspillagas had agreed
to help Medina Cedron lease the Hacienda del Colegio in Chota because
they felt that it would allow him to supply Cayalti with 100 more peons.
Moreover, enganche contracts signed between Pomalca and Eduardo Tiravante generally stipulated that he supply from 200 to 250 peons from one or
more of his estates in Chota. It is also significant that the only contractor
found to recruit exclusively on the coast, Miguel Arbulu Gonzales, rented
small to medium sized estates in Lambayeque.
Contractors who either owned or rented haciendas were able to force
tenants and sub-tenants to fulfill rent obligations by working on the coast.
This is documented for the estate Yaucan and for the haciendas studied by
Solomon Miller in the highlands of La Libertad.
Nevertheless, enganchadores did not always have to resort to such tactics
to recruit labour. In many cases, peons voluntarily agreed to work on the
coast, owing to the economic and demographic pressures mentioned earlier.
Peasants would either present themselves at a contractor's office or sign a
contract while drunk at a fiesta. The latter practice was so common that
planters helped contractors purchase alcohol for the occasions, and counted
on receiving new recruits following major holidays.
Planters, for their part, preferred to deal with contractors who were
merchants or merchant-hacendados. There were two basic reasons for this:
this type of contractor could deliver more peons, and he was less of a financial
risk. For example, at Pomalca contractors generally guaranteed repayment of
all advances received from planters against seizure of their property in the
sierra.
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A. H. to A.H., 3 May 1897, A.F.A.
Carlos J. Bachmann, Departamento
de Lambayeque
(Lima, 1921), pp. 1 4 5 - 6 ;
George R. Fitz-Roy Cole, The Peruvians at Home (London, 1884), pp. 136, 149.
Both sources mention the Arbulu family as estate owners. Miguel Arbulu Gonzdles
appears as a labour contractor in Contratos de la Hacienda Pomalca, A.F.A.; A.H.
to A.H., 24 June 1888, A.F.A.; Contracts between Eduardo Tiravante and the
Hacienda Pomalca, 1 May 1 9 1 2 and 20 June 1 9 1 7 , A.F.A.
N. Tello to A.H., 20 March 1899, A . F . A ; V.A.T. to A.H., 20 March 1920, A.F.A.;
Solomon Miller, 'Hacienda to Plantation in Northern Peru: The Process of Prole
tarianization of a Tenant Farmer Society,' in Vol. Ill, Contemporary Change in
Traditional Society, Julian Steward (ed.) (Urbana, 111., 1967), pp. 169-70.

» A.H. to A.H., 27 June 1889, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., July 3 1 , 1889, A.F.A.; A.H.
to A.H., 1 1 October 1892, A.F.A.; Correspondence of the labour contractor Catalino
Coronado, A.F.A.; Interview with Galindo Bravo, C A P PucaW, 27 June 1 9 7 5 .
Bravo was originally contracted to work at Pucala by Catalino Coronado. In 1975
he was a member of the Consejo de Administration,
CAP Pucala.
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In return for a guarantee to supply a large number of peons (e.g. 250),
planters frequently granted contractors monopoly rights to contract in a
district. For example, Pomalca gave this right to Melchor Montoya Espino
for the District of Bambamarca in 1900, and to the Tiravante brothers for
the District of Chota several times between 1900 and 1930. Likewise,
Cayalti extended this privilege to Medina Cedron for the District of Bam
bamarca during the nineteenth century.
Still, even with monopoly privileges, competition for labour was intense.
Thus, in November of 1919 there were twelve contractors recruiting in the
District of Bambamarca with a total capital of S/.50,000 for making
advances to peons.
Labor recruitment involved the signing of two contracts: one between
plantation and contractor and another between contractor and peon. Peons
received a cash advance from contractors, varying between 10 and 50 soles,
which they agreed to repay with their labour on the coast. Peons might also
agree to work off previous debts or rent. T o assure repayment, the peon and
a co-signer put up as collateral their possessions and labour, and surrendered
all rights to contest the contract in court. Peons also agreed to work a certain
number of days, typically ninety, in case they repaid their loans very quickly.
Although it was unstated in the contract, peons discounted their debt in
voluntarily. Thus, each pay-day either the contractor or the estate, depending
on the source of capital for the loan, received the peon's wage (except for a
small amount, generally 10 centavos) until the loan was repaid. Peons did not
starve because they received a daily ration.
Planters attempted to control labour supply, in part, through contracts
with enganchadores.
These agreements obligated contractors to supply a
number of peons within a certain period of time (usually one to two months)
to work at whatever job the estate desired. Planters generally advanced con
tractors enough money (usually by cheque) to cover the cost of loans to peons.
To assure repayment, contractors sometimes put up as collateral property in
the sierra, usually an estate or a business. Finally, enganchadores were granted
a percentage of the total amount of wages earned by their peons as a com
mission. A commission of 20 percent was common, although it fluctuated.
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Ibid.; Cayalti Correspondence.
S. Tello to A.H., 2 November 1 9 1 9 , A.F.A. In 1 9 1 9 dollars, S/. 50,000 = 524,000.
Contratos de enganche, Hda. Tuman, A.F.A.; Letter dated 19 June 1 9 1 9 , Cayalti
Correspondence, A.F.A.; Ulloa Sotomayor. In 1900 dollars, S/. 50 = 524.25; S/.
1 0 = 5 4 . 8 5 ; 40 centavos = 5.825.
Contratos de la Hacienda Pomalca,
A.F.A.; Various contracts in the Cayalti
Correspondence, A.F.A.
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Demand for labour
The preceding discusion has presented the sierra, or supply side, of labour
contracting. What remains to be analysed is the plantation, or demand side,
of the process. Here Cayalti represents an example of a modernizing estate
with basic similarities with other north coast plantations. Enganche viewed
from Cayalti shows that labour contracting was a relatively efficient system
which responded to capital. Thus, planters could determine the flow of
labour, under normal market conditions, through the flow of money to
enganchadores. Ultimately, the price of sugar determined how much capital
the Aspillagas were willing to allocate for enganche and how many peons
they could pay, although unforeseen events, such as wars and droughts,
occasionally disrupted established patterns of supply.
The Aspillagas' first serious experience with enganche began in September,
1878. This first encounter, however, proved to be so disappointing that they
adopted a policy of restraint and caution over the next few years which
prevented the large scale recruitment of serranos. The cause for the initiation
of labour contracting was a severe labour shortage caused by the construction
of a new mill, which took men out of their regular jobs, and the end to
Chinese immigration. The Aspillagas negotiated with an enganchador to
transfer 50 serranos from a neighbouring estate, and advanced him an
additional S/. 1,300 to contract more workers. A t the same time, they
forwarded S/.400 to another contractor to find more workers for Cayalti.
Within a month, however, all but a few of the serranos had repaid their loans
and returned to the sierra, and no new workers had arrived to take their
place.
After this disappointing experience, the Aspillagas were very reluctant to
advance money to contractors and to pay them standard commissions.
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that very few serranos were
contracted to work at Cayalti. The Aspillagas' first real success with
enganche came in 1886 when they signed an agreement with Medina Cedr6n
of Bambamarca, who agreed to contract peons without receiving advances.
This he could do by allowing peasants who had purchased goods on credit at
his store to work off their debts on the coast. Medina Cedron was successful
in part because Bambamarca had recovered much more rapidly from the
war than had neighbouring areas, which aided his store and, consequendy,
41
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A.H. to A.H., 24 September 1878, A . F . A ; A.H. to A.H., 30 September 1878,
A . F . A ; A H . to A.H., 21 October 1878, A . F . A ; A.H. to A.H., 14 October 1879,
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his enganche business. Thus, he was able to double his supply of peons at
Cayalti from 60 in July, 1886, to 120 in March, 1888.
At that juncture, the Aspillagas were enthusiastic about the future of
enganche,
since Medina Cedron accepted all financial risks and serranos had
proved themselves to be good workers. Besides, the Aspillagas had no choice
but to continue contracting serranos, as each year the Chinese population
grew smaller and less capable of manning the development of Cayalti.
As a result, management decided to liberalize its policy on advances and to
broaden the scope of labour contracting to include other parts of the sierra.
Thus, at the Aspillagas' urging, Medina Cedron signed a new contract agree
ing to contract in Chota and to supply Cayalti with a minimum of 200
peons. T o assist him, the Aspillagas agreed to pay 25 percent of all advances
and to help him gain the lease to the Hacienda del
Colegio.^
These measures were successful in part because of changing conditions in
the sierra. Perhaps most significantly, by the end of the decade more
merchants, hacendados and peasants were aware of the benefits of enganche.
Moreover, the chaotic conditions of the war years in Chota were now quieted;
and the mining industry in Bambabarca, which had taken labour away from
the coast, was now declining. Thus, by May, 1890, the serrano population at
Cayalti, composed mostly of people from Bambamarca, had grown to over
23o.
There was, however, a definite seasonality to labour supply at Cayalti
during the 1880s, evolving around climate and planting seasons in the sierra.
Peons tended to repay their loans in time to return home by September or
October to plant crops before the first rains. Thereafter, many peons would
return to the plantations as early as November but would tend to leave again
by February or March, which were the hottest months on the coast and
coincided with a second planting season in the sierra.
The 1890s witnessed a movement away from this pattern as serranos began
to be re-contracted on the estate, which led to the formation of a more
enganchadores
permanent work force, and new contracts were signed with
in Bambamarca, Santa Cruz and Sorochuco. As a result, the number of
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A.H. to A.H., 30 July 1886, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 29 March 1888, A.F.A.; A.A.B.
to R.A.B. and I.A.B., 10 October 1888, A.F.A.
A.H. to A.H., 12 November 1886, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 31 July 1885, A.F.A.
A.H. to A.H., 5 June 1889(a), A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 22 June 1889, A.F.A.; A.H.
to A.H., 11 July 1889(a), A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 24 June 1888, A.F.A.
A.H. to A.H., 7 May 1890, A.F.A.
A.H. to A.H., 16 October 1885, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 23 September 1888, A.F.A.;
A.H. to A.H., 3 October 1889(a), A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 15 November 1889,
A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 16 November 1 8 9 1 , A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 16 February
1892, A.F.A.
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serranos at Cayalti increased from 500 in 1895 to 900 by the turn of the
century.
As all north coast sugar cane plantations converted to serrano labour,
enganche became a more competitive business, driving wages and contractors'
commissions upwards. This was a serious problem for the Aspillagas, and
presumably other planters, because the price of sugar throughout the decade
was dangerously low. The Aspillagas were caught between their growing
inability to pay higher wages and the growing demands of contractors to raise
wages and commissions. The situation came to a head in 1897 when the
price of sugar hit a new low, and contractors began withdrawing workers to
other estates which were paying higher wages and commissions. For the time
being, the Aspillagas allowed the work force to diminish, taking solace in the
fact that this also reduced expenditures during a time of shrinking profits.
But when the price of sugar rose modestly two years later, management con
sented to an increase in wages and commissions, and there quickly followed
an increase in the size of the work force.
A similar situation occurred in 1902 when the price of sugar set another
record low, causing a reduction in wages as well as the outright dismissal of
several hundred workers. Nevertheless, once the price of sugar had risen far
enough in management's judgment to justify increases in wages and com
missions, hundreds of new workers appeared.
48

TABLE I

4 9

Daily Cash Wages,* Contractors' Commissions, and the Si%e of the
Work Force at Cayalti, iSf>/-ipoj
Year

Daily Cash Wage
(centavos)

Contractors' Commissions
{percent of daily cash wage)

1897
1899
1902
1905

40
50
40
50

20
2}f
25
25

Number of Workers
700
900
750
1,250

* Wages were determined by piece work, and included a daily ration of beef, rice,
and salt. In 1900 dollars, 40 centavos = 19-40 cents, and 50 centavos=24-25 cents.
f In 1899, commissions were calculated on the basis of a 40 centavo cash wage.
Nevertheless, there was still a 5 percent increase in commission.
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A.H. to A.H., 12 November 1890, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 19 January 1900, A.F.A.;
B.A.B. to A.H., 13 February 1892, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 27 July 1892, A . F . A ;
A.H. to A.H., 24 September 1895, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 23 April 1895, A.F.A.
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Despite these periodic turnovers in the work force, a core of several
hundred workers was required to keep the plantation running at all times.
Among these workers there was a growing tendency to remain on the estate
for longer periods of time. For example, in May of 1899 an Aspillaga wrote:
The contractor Negrete, who has the most peons [400 in 1905], only occasionally
receives a peon from his associate Zarate in the sierra. All of his peons, one can say,
are contracted here, so that they have a constant body of workers [una peonada
constante]

...

5

0

This, in turn, had a dramatic social impact on Cayalti, as a community of
was transferred to the coast.

serranos

. . . we now have many peons from Celedin with the advantage that they have a
temperament very similar to coastal dwellers and they become acclimatised more
easily than others, although it is true that those from Bambamarca could not have
become better acclimatised. We have here a true community from Bambamarca,
people who have been accustomed [to Cayalti] in such a way that they do not
move from here. [Moreover] . . .all come with their families....
61

Many of these workers clearly chose to remain longer, attracted by the good
wages and the availability of credit in the form of advances on wages from
contractors and the estate. This is shown by the fact that hundreds of workers
were signing new contracts on the estate and establishing households there.
The Aspillagas and contractors had sought the formation of a more per
manent work force for obvious reasons. For the Aspillagas, permanency
guaranteed an adequate number of workers to maintain desired production
levels, while for contractors, re-signing workers on the estate reduced the
number of recruiting trips and capital ouday, as initial advances were tradi
tionally larger than supplemental loans. In addition to relatively good wages,
which included daily rations of meat and rice, the Aspillagas enticed workers
to remain by constructing better housing to supplement the dilapidated
barracks (galpones) used to house the Chinese. The best of these new homes
were given to workers with families because they remained the longest.
52

A.F.A.; Negrete Hnos. to A.H., 21 February 1902, A.F.A.; B.A.B. to A.H.,
4 February 1903, A.F.A.; S. Tello to B.A.B., 10 March 1903, A.F.A.; A.H. to
A.H., 4 June 1895, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 15 September 1897, A.F.A.; N. Salcedo
to A.H., 5 May 1900, A.F.A.; B.AB. to A.H., 28 June 1902, A.F.A.; F. P£rez
Cespedes to R.A.B., 18 August 1905, A.F.A. By 1905, virtually all Chinese workers
had been replaced by Peruvians. The last mention of the Chinese at Cayalti was in
1907 when thirty were expelled from the estate. See, V.A.T. to A.H., 12 September
1907, A.F.A.
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Permanency is a much more complicated question than this, however,
because many other workers were forced to remain on the estate undl they
had repaid outstanding debts. Such compulsion has been referred to as in
debted peonage. Indebted peonage was used by Cayalti to hold on to Chinese
workers, and by hacendados throughout Latin America since the Colonial
Period. In recent publications, however, it has been argued that the inci
dence of indebted peonage and oppression has been greatly exaggerated, and
that peasants, more often than not, freely sold their labour in an open mar
ket. The discussion can perhaps be advanced by looking more closely at the
demand for labour in the context of economic structure, political economy
and social control.
T o control their Chinese workers, the Aspillagas and other sugar planters
had relied upon violence and indebted peonage, and they continued to use
these methods with Peruvian peons. Planters could generally count on the
support of local officials, who sometimes doubled as labour contractors.
Moreover, the central government (in which sugar planters participated)
condoned enganche
and even used it on occasion for large construction
projects in the sierra. However, no administration was likely to allow
planters to intimidate Peruvian peons the way they did the Chinese, who
were even subjected to torture and execution. Furthermore, the national
government was never involved in the large scale recruitment and transporta
tion of peons to plantations, as was the Diaz regime in Mexico, and peons
sometimes benefited from squabbling between local officials and planters.
Highlanders also had more options than the Chinese because of their
greater physical mobility and the increasing demand for their labour.
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An early reference to indebted peonage among Peruvian labourers finds
the Aspillagas saying: ' Y o u cannot imagine what we have to do to obtain
people, to the extreme of deceiving the bastard peons who each day become
more demoralized.. . . ' In the years to follow, they made these comments:
We have only allowed to go those who have repaid their loans and, in spite of
everything, there are more than 200 serranos.... Yesterday Mr. Sebastian Tello
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For example, see Bauer, op. cit.
In the late 1890s the government used enganche to build a road from Tarma into
the Selva. See El Comercio, November 28a, December 5b, 1 1 a , 18a, 1896; February
16a, March 23b, April 8b, June 14a, October 4b, 1897; May 14a, June 4b, 7b, July
14b, 1898. I am indebted to Peter Blanchard for this reference.
Gonzales, op. cit. Chapter VI.
Friedrich Katz, 'Labor Conditions on Haciendas in Porfirian Mexico: Some Trends
and Tendencies,' Hispanic American Historical Review, No. 54 (February 1974),
pp. 1 5 - 2 3 .
On the Chinese, see Gonzales, op. cit., Chapters V and VI.
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told me that the Negretes [contractors] were going to have to take 200 men to
Tuman [a neighboring estate] and that they were about to pay what they owed to
the estate. That I cannot believe, and if such a thing is attempted, I will tell them
that while they do not pay in labour what they owe they cannot move those
people from the estate. We will see how things develop. I will try to manage them
with the utmost calm and sagacity.
68

Forcing indebted workers to remain on the estate was of questionable
legality. But there is also a point of legality here with respect to peons.
They guaranteed repayment of their loans from contractors, and those who
defaulted somedmes had their property (or that of a co- signer) confiscated.
The Aspillagas, however, did not require promissory notes, preferring to
pressure contractors to get their money back for them, and to organize posses
to hunt down debtors who had fled the estate. More will be said about this
later.
59
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After they began work on Cayalti, many workers accumulated substantial
debts, up to S/.100 and more, and then found it difficult to repay such large
sums. One principal reason for this was that many workers could not work
a full work week. New workers in particular found it difficult to adjust to a
regimented work routine and to the hot coastal climate. Moreover, there was
always a large number of ill workers, the result of the presence of a variety
of communicable diseases (including malaria, yellow fever, tuberculosis,
influenza, and bubonic plague), and the Aspillagas' failure to provide
adequate medical care.
61
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Indebted peonage, of course, benefited the Aspillagas most during periods
of labour shortages. For example, in March 1891, a larger than usual work
force was needed to clean the main irrigation canal, a major undertaking in
itself, and to begin milling after a temporary shutdown. As the Aspillagas
explained later, they managed to retain enough workers to accomplish both
jobs because 'we have only let go those who have paid their loan. . . '
Indebted peonage was, however, a double-edged sword for the Aspillagas.
When they had an adequate number of workers (or a surplus) they com
plained about the large sums of money that they had sunk into workers'
o s
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A.H. to A.H., 14 October 1879, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H. 25 March 1 8 9 1 , A.F.A.;
Francisco Perez Cespedes to A.H., 5 April 1902, A.F.A.
Felipe Yanes Abarca, 'Sistema de enganche, Distrito de Sorochuco-Hacienda
Cayalti' (B.S. Thesis, Pontificia Universidad Cat61ica del Peru, 1972).
A.H. to A.H. 2 July 1897, A.F.A.; V.A.T. to A.H., 28 August 1907, A.F.A.
A.H. to A.H., 15 November 1892, A.F.A. and below. In 1900 dollars, S/.
100 = 548.50.
See Gonzales, op. cit. Chapters VI and VIII.
A.H. to A.H., 25 March 1891, A.F.A.
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loans. This was a particularly serious problem during periods of very low
sugar prices. Another problem was that some peons received loans from
more than one contractor (plus the estate), sometimes using fictitious names.
The chief engineer, the Englishman Thomas Colston, once even stated that
some mill workers purposely ran up a debt so as to ensure themselves regular
employment.
The estate also had to concern itself with what to do with ill or injured
peons who were indebted but could not work. If these workers were expelled
from the estate, the plantation lost money. But if they were retained, they
occupied valuable housing and did little or no work. Twice during die early
twentieth century, a period of especially low sugar prices, management chose
to expell seriously ill workers, assuming that they would never be able to
repay their debts in any case. Generally, however, debilitated workers simply
wasted away on the plantation itself.
T h e r e were other ways to circumvent indebted peonage. Indebted workers
could receive permission from the estate or their contractors to visit neigh
bouring towns or their relatives in the sierra. Furthermore, almost from the
onset of enganche the Aspillagas and contractors had to contend with in
debted peons fleeing from the estate. The reasons for escapes were not
mysterious. Clearly, some new recruits found it difficult to adjust to the work
routine and climate but workers also fled from their debts or to seek higher
wages elsewhere.
Contractors on neighbouring estates signed on escaped peons sometimes,
but not always, unaware that they were runaways. This practice made the
capturing of escapees particularly difficult, as contractors were naturally
reluctant to return runaways once they had advanced them money.
Cayalti attempted to prevent escapes by having peons supervised while
they worked. The Aspillagas generally blamed supervisors (caporales) for
escapes, although caporales typically had to supervise from 50 to 100 peons
who might be spread out over a considerable area. Peons could also hide in
groves of mature cane, which grew far above their heads, or in irrigation
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S.E. Medina to A.A.B., 5 August 1902, A.F.A.; Thomas Colston to A . H , 14 Octo
ber 1901, A.F.A.
Gonzales, op. cit., Chapter VII.
Correspondence of Tuman and Cayalti, A.F.A.
Correspondence of Catalino Coronado, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 18 November 1887,
A.F.A.; B.A.B. to A.H., 6 December 1902, A.F.A.; Negrete Hnos. to A.H., 12 June
1903, A . F . A ; V.A.T to A.H., 1 1 August 1908, A.F.A.; V.A.T. to A.H., 14 October
1908, A.F.A.; B.A.B. to A.H., 26 October 1908, A.F.A.
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canals, and take advantage of the lack of electric lighting to escape into the
night.
Once peons had escaped from Cayalti, caporales and sometimes contractors
organized search parties and local authorities, and planters were notified.
Nevertheless, rival planters and contractors did not always allow caporales
to search for runaways on their estates, especially if some of their peons had
been recently stolen. Moreover, it is difficult to judge how much assistance
the Aspillagas received from public officials in capturing runaways. A letter
from a contractor in Bambamarca in 1905 suggests that local officials there
(including the judge) generally jailed runaways upon request until they could
be taken down to the coast. However, the letter went on to complain that in
recent weeks normal co-operation had not been forthcoming. In 1908, an
Aspillaga suggested that the family might receive greater co-operation from
the Governor of Sana if it offered to pay him 50 centavos for every runaway
from Cayalti he captured, which was 50 centavos less than contractors in the
neighbouring Chicama Valley paid their local governor.
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It is impossible to calculate how many peons escaped from Cayalti during
these years. However, it is more important to understand what impact
escapes had on enganche. and the efficacy of indebted peonage. The frequency
of escapes, I believe, points to three conclusions: (1) Escapes softened the
effectiveness of indebted peonage but did not render it totally ineffective,
especially during periods of labour shortages when the estate was likely to
hold on to workers at all costs. ( 2 ) Despite escapes, labour was easy enough to
acquire, given the proper incentives, so that new peons could be found to
replace runaways. Therefore, the prevalence of escapes did not seriously
threaten the operation of the estate. (3) Escapes were, undoubtedly, a financial
drain on contractors and planters. However, in the long run, both profited
from the sugar i n d u s t r y .
73

Conclusion
It is clear that market forces and capital incentives played an important
role in the operation of enganche. Peons sought high wages on the coast,
migrating and establishing households hundreds of miles from their homes.
69 Negrete Hnos. to A.H., 12 June 1903, A.F.A.; S. Tello to A.H., 25 October 1905,
A.F.A.; V.A.T. to A.H., 1 4 October 1908, A.F.A.; B.A.B. to A.H., 26 October
1908, A.F.A.
vo Negrete Hnos. to A.H., 12 June 1903, A.F.A.
N. Tello to A.H., 29 November 1905, A.F.A. An example of the use of force to
detain escapees is V.A.T. to A.H., n August 1908, A.F.A.
V.A.T. to A.H., 14 October 1908, A.F.A.
Gonzales, op. cit. pp. 56-62, 250.
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They even moved from one estate to another in search of higher incomes.
Planters could also pull the strings on labour supply, under normal con
ditions, through the allocation of money for advances to labour contractors.
The offering of loans and comparatively good wages was enticement enough
for many to migrate, although others agreed to work on the coast to cancel an
old debt. The amount of capital planters were willing to advance to con
tractors, in turn, depended largely on the price of sugar on the world market.
This was the link that connected Liverpool with a tiny village in the Peruvian
highlands.
It should not be forgotten, however, that deception and coercion also
played a part in labour contracting. A t Cayalti, the Aspillagas did what they
could to acquire a stable work force, regardless of the legal and moral impli
cations. They had fewer restrictions on their actions during the years of
economic and political chaos, from roughly 1873-1895, and it was easier for
them to exploit the Chinese, w h o as foreigners from a w e a k k i n g d o m were
not well protected. The Aspillagas did not have much more respect for the
civil and human rights of Peruvian peons, but as the economy and state
became more organized they could not rely as heavily on violence to control
the work force. This did not prevent contractors, however, from tricking
peons into signing contracts nor the Aspillagas from attempting to bind
indebted workers to the estate.
Thus, what emerges from this analysis is a new interpretation of enganche.
By paying closer attention to changes in the regional and international
economies, and relating them to socio-political reality, labour contracting
appears not as semi-slavery, as described by its early opponents, nor as a free
market system of labour supply, as some have recently said. Rather, it clearly
reflects both the demands of the marketplace and evolving methods of social
and political control which did not always protect human and civil rights.
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APPENDIX

Price of Raw Sugar {Cost, Insurance, Freight) in
London, 1872-190;
(Shillings Per Cwt.)
Year

Price

Year

Price

1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888

25/6
22/6
21/6
20/0
21/6
24/6
20/0
19/0
20/6
21/3
20/0
19/0

1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905

16/0
13/0
13/6
13/6

13/3
13/6
11/9
11/9
13/0

14/3
11/3
10/0
10/9
9/3
9/6
10/6
"/3

9/3
7/3
8/6
10/3

11 /o

J W « : N o e l D e e r r , TA« H/x/ory of Sugar, V o l . I I ( N . Y . ,
1
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